Wage and Income Inequality in Slovenia, 1993-2002 by Tine Stanovnik & Miroslav Verbic
1
Wage and Income Inequality in Slovenia, 1993-2002
1
Tine Stanovnik* and Miroslav Verbi￿**
* University of Ljubljana, Slovenia, E-mail: tine.stanovnik@ef.uni-lj.si 




This paper analyses the dynamics of wage and income inequality in Slovenia from 1993 
to 2002, using two different data sources. The first is obtained by extracting relevant 
information on wage earners from the personal income tax (PIT) database and the 
second is obtained using published data on wages and the wage distribution. Analyses 
of both datasets clearly show a large increase in wage inequality in the period 1993-
1995. However, even after 1995 wage inequality has been creeping up. To a large 
degree, we ascribe the major increase in wage inequality to the rapid development of a 
full-fledged market economy and also to the changing PIT legislation. A growing 
individualization of wage contracts doubtlessly also contributed to increased inequality. 
In addition, our analysis touches upon the effects of the tax system and shows that the 
tax system significantly moderated the large increases in income inequality. 
 
JEL classification: D33, H24, P20. 




Central and Eastern European countries have undergone profound political, economic 
and social transformations during the 1990s. One of the consequences of such societal 
transformations was a large increase in income inequality. This is quite understandable; 
in the socialist and communist regimes wages were mostly set administratively, so that 
wage dispersion was compressed. With the dismantling of the old regime, market forces 
became a more decisive factor in wage setting and this invariably resulted in an increase 
in wage inequality. Clearly, an analysis of the inequality of market incomes does not 
provide ‘the whole picture’, as this increase in inequality was – to a certain extent – 
moderated by the tax system and system of social transfers. Thus, income inequality can 
be analyzed on two different levels: the level of market (‘factor’) incomes and the level 
of disposable income, i.e. income after the redistributive effects of the tax and transfer 
system. Obviously, the analysis of the inequality of disposable income provides a better 
indication of the changes in the welfare levels. Here, households are taken as the unit of 
analysis, and current monetary disposable income as the relevant income measure. 
 
1 The authors are deeply indebted to Tatjana Novak and Andrej Haramina from the Statistical office of the 
Republic of Slovenia for providing data from the PIT database. We are also grateful to Saša Kova￿i￿ and 
Brane Miši￿ for valuable advice. Needless to say, the authors are solely responsible for any remaining 
errors or misinterpretations. 2
Our analysis will focus mainly on the first level, i.e. the analysis of market incomes. 
Before proceeding to this, Section 2 will provide a brief and selective overview of 
international research on income inequality, whereas Section 3 will offer some of the 
main findings of the dynamics in inequality of current disposable household monetary 
income in Slovenia. Section 4 is devoted to our main topic – analysis of wage and 
income inequality in Slovenia. This analysis will be performed using two different 
datasets. The first is obtained by extracting relevant data on wage earners from the 
personal income tax (PIT) dataset. The extraction and grouping of data was performed 
by the Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia (SORS). The second source is data 
on wages, published by the SORS for the months March and September; these data are 
collected from the employers. The two different data sources are used in the analysis in 
order to give greater weight to our conclusions. 
 
2. A Selective Overview of Comparative Studies on Income Inequality 
 
Studies on income inequality are multiplying at a fast rate, doubtlessly caused by the 
large research interest in the phenomenon of globalization and its effects on income 
inequality within a country. Here, research deals not only with the analysis of market 
incomes, but also with the effects of the tax/transfer system on income inequality.  
  For example, Caminada and Goudswaard (2001) studied the effects of social policy 
on income inequality in OECD countries. They regressed the Gini coefficient, using as 
explanatory variables – in turn – social expenditures and the replacement rate, i.e. the 
ratio between the average old-age pension and average wage. The latter regression gave 
a better fit, and the value of the estimated parameter was negative, meaning that 
countries with greater inequality also had a lower replacement rate. They analysed the 
dynamics of income inequality in the Netherlands in particular detail and showed that 
the large increase in income inequality during the 1980s and 1990s could be traced to 
the reform of the social protection system, caused by the deteriorating economic 
conditions of the 1980s. 
 MilanoviH (1999a), using the Luxembourg Income Survey (LIS) database and 
selecting OECD countries, showed that countries with larger inequalities in factor 
(‘market’) incomes also experienced larger income redistribution. In another study, 
MilanoviH (1994) uses as a starting point the well known Kuznets’ curve, i.e. the 
inverted U-shaped curve, which depicts the changing income inequality during the 
phases of economic development; initially low, then increasing and finally decreasing in 
the highly developed stage. MilanoviH explores whether differences in income 
inequality between countries can be explained not only by the ‘stages’ of economic 
development, but also by certain country-specific characteristics. He regressed the Gini 
coefficient on several variables that captured these country-specific characteristics: (1) 
the income heterogeneity of a country, i.e. the income differences between regions; (2) 
the share of employees in the public sector (as percentage of all employees) and (3) the 
share of social transfers in GDP. According to expectations, the variable capturing 
income heterogeneity ought to be positively correlated, whereas the second and third 
variable ought to be negatively correlated with income inequality. In actual fact, all the 
estimated coefficients were of the expected sign. MilanoviH (1999b) also explores the 
causes for the increase in income inequality in six Central and Eastern European 
countries during the period 1987-1995 and shows that the most important explanatory 3
factor for this large increase was the increase in wage inequality, with the development 
of the private sector also contributing to overall income inequality. 
  Gustafsson and Johansson (1997) studied several groups of factors, which could 
plausibly explain the differences in income inequality between countries. Based on a 
simple regression equation estimated on a time series of several countries, they find that 
the size of the public sector and the structure of the labour force, i.e. the share of women 
in the labour force, are negatively correlated with income inequality. On the other hand, 
countries with higher foreign trade, measured as percentage of GDP, also have higher 
income inequality. 
  Atkinson, in his more recent work (Atkinson, 2002), studied nine developed OECD 
countries and shows that their income inequality paths (based on disposable monetary 
household income) differ widely. In the long period since the 1960s, Atkinson describes 
the income inequality trajectory with the letter ‘U’. In the USA and Great Britain this 
trajectory resembles a ‘U’ with a serif, meaning a decrease in the 1960s and 1970s, 
increase in the 1980s and very little change in the 1990s. In Finland the income 
inequality trajectory resembles a ‘U’, with a large increase in the 1990s, whereas in the 
Netherlands it is more like a ‘U’ with a serif, due to a levelling-off of inequality during 
the 1990s. A modest increase in the 1990s, without any clear pattern, is characteristic 
for the dynamics of income inequality in Germany, whereas Italy experienced large falls 
and rises in income inequality, so that the trajectory could best be described by the letter 
‘W’. Somewhat in accordance with Atkinson’s findings, O’Rourke (2002, p. 60) also 
shows that the experience of particular countries are quite diverse, and that the 
relationship between globalization and inequality is not clear-cut. 
  Of particular interest is Atkinsons’ analysis of the upper end of the income 
distribution, showing that the share of income accruing to the top one per cent of the 
population in USA, Great Britain and Canada increased considerably. Atkinson explains 
these increases with ‘[…] the forces of globalization and technology [which have] 
raised the rents of those with the very highest abilities’ (Atkinson, 2002, p.28). 
However, it must be stressed that this phenomenon is not as pronounced in other 
countries included in the analysis. 
 
3. A Brief Overview of Studies on Income Inequality in Slovenia 
 
There are a number of studies on income inequality in Slovenia, mostly based on two 
different data sources. The first is the Household Expenditure Survey (HES), where the 
income data refer to net income, i.e. household current disposable monetary income. 
These surveys do not contain data on gross income. The other data source is the PIT 
file. This file contains data on income, subject to tax, for all taxable persons, i.e. persons 
obliged to file the PIT form. 
  Neither data source is ‘ideal’. The HES is somewhat problematic because of 
underreporting; related to this is the fact that data on income are not collected through 
administrative sources. As for the PIT file, it obviously does not include persons who 
are not liable for PIT, nor does it include income, which is not subject to tax (most 
pensions and other social transfers). Also, the PIT legislation changed in 1993, reducing 
the number of taxable persons significantly. Thus, the comparisons of data from PIT file 
for the pre-1993 and post-1993 period is meaningful only by extracting – and analysing 
separately – those types of taxable persons (wage-earners, self-employed), whose 4
inclusion was not affected by changes in legislation. We shall now turn to a brief 
description of studies based on the HES and PIT files. 
 
3.1. Analyses of Income Inequality Based on Household Budget Surveys 
 
Stropnik and Stanovnik (2002) studied the impact of social transfers on income 
inequality and poverty during the 1990s in Slovenia. The analysis was based on the 
1993 HES and the merged annual HES for 1997, 1998 and 1999; current household 
disposable monetary income was used as the income measure
2. The analysis showed 
that – quite according to expectations – social transfers decrease the risk-of-poverty and 
also result in lower income inequality. The Gini coefficient of income inequality, based 
on the 1993 HES was 0.267, whereas the computed Gini coefficient base on the merged 
1997-1999 HES was 0.236. It seems that some ‘credit’ for such a large drop can be 
ascribed to the lower willingness of respondents to report their income, with 
underreporting being more concentrated among the self-employed. 
  Ook (2003), using the 1983, 1993 and 1997-1998 HES decomposed income 
inequality by income sources as well as according to various subgroups, defined with 
regard to: (1) the socioeconomic status of the head of household; (2) age of the head of 
household and (3) attained educational level of the head of household.  
 
3.2. Analyses Based on PIT Data 
 
Stanovnik (1999), using large simple random samples from the PIT database for the 
years 1991 and 1996, concludes that income inequality has increased in this period. As 
there were significant changes in the PIT legislation (in 1993) – these mostly concerned 
the taxation of pensions – persons receiving pensions were eliminated from the sample. 
This enabled a satisfactory comparability of the two datasets. The analysis of wage 
inequality has shown that a particularly large increase in wages occurred in the highest – 
tenth decile. Studies have also shown that, in the first years of transition, large increase 
in the returns to education occurred, particularly university education (Oražem and 
Vodopivec, 1995; Stanovnik, 1997). This provides at least one explanation for the 
increase in wage dispersion in the beginning of the transition process. 
  Kump (2002) analysed the PIT data for the years 1991 in 2000. Similarly to the 
study by Stanovnik (1999), her analysis is also based on large simple random samples
3
and she also eliminated pensioners from the sample. However, her analysis represents a 
significant improvement on previous research, due to the fact that data on social 
contributions and PIT paid were also available. Her analysis has shown that income 
inequality (of gross incomes), measured by the Gini coefficient was much larger in 
2000 than in 1991, but the Gini coefficient for net income (i.e. gross income net of 
social contributions and paid PIT) remained virtually unchanged. Clearly, the 
explanation lies in the increased progressivity of the PIT, resulting from the new 1993 
PIT legislation
4.
2 This includes labour income, capital income, income from self-employment, pensions, other social 
transfers, intrafamily monetary gifts and transfers. The normal OECD equivalence scale was used.  
3 We note that the tax authorities do not permit the use of the complete dataset. 
4 The PIT act, passed toward the end of 1993 (Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, 71/93), was in 
force starting from 1994, meaning that incomes in 1994 were already being taxed with the ‘new’ PIT.  5
Whereas the analyses by Stanovnik and Kump were based on samples from the PIT 
database, the analysis by Borak and Pfajfar (2002) was based on grouped data, obtained 
from the whole PIT database. Their analysis includes the whole period 1991-2000, so 
that it is possible to trace inequality measures year-by-year
5. However, a serious 
weakness, which they did not address, is comparability between the pre-1993 and post-
1993 datasets, caused by the 1993 PIT legislation and subsequent large reduction in the 
number of taxable persons
6. In fairness, the authors were fully conscience of this 
difficulty, and briefly commented: ‘This change [of the tax legislation] will disturb the 
comparability of the parameters calculated throughout the analysis’ (Borak and Pfajfar, 
2002, p. 456). Their analysis shows that larger changes in income inequality were 
confined to the initial years of transition, i.e. the period 1991-1993. One must single out 
the year 1993, when the Gini coefficient sharply increased (from 0.3327 to 0.3595), and 
1994, in which the Gini coefficient significantly decreased (from 0.3595 to 0.3449). In 
our view, this ‘roller-coaster’ ride was mostly due to changes in the population of 
taxable persons; these changes took effect already in 1993 and were completed in 1994. 
After 1994 the inequality changes were quite modest. Overall, in spite of the large 
increase in the Gini coefficient for gross income, from 0,325 in 1991 to 0,353 in 2000, 
the increase in the Gini coefficient for net income was moderate; from 0,305 in 1991 to 
0,317 in 2000
7.
4. Analysis of Income Inequality of Wage Earners and Analysis of Inequality of 
Wages, 1993-2002 
 
Having briefly reviewed research on income inequality, based on the PIT data, we note 
that this research still leaves ‘much to be desired’, as it did not resolve problems of the 
PIT database in a completely satisfactory manner. This means that problems with data 
comparability were either not dealt with (as in Borak and Pfajfar, 2002) or resolved in 
an ad hoc manner (Stanovnik, 1999, and Kump, 2002). Furthermore, only the analysis 
by Borak and Pfajfar (2002) analyzes year-by-year developments, whereas the other two 
studies (Stanovnik, 1999, and Kump, 2002) deal with two cross-sections. The purpose 
of our analysis is to overcome these shortcomings and provide correct comparisons of 
income inequality on a year-by-year basis. The analysis will focus on income inequality 
of market incomes – more precisely, we will deal only with the most important market 
income – wages. However, we will also endeavour to shed some more light on 
understanding of the dynamics of inequality of after-tax income in Slovenia.  
  For this purpose, we will use the PIT database, but extract from this base the most 
numerous and most important group of taxable persons – wage earners. Apart from this 
database, we will also use data on the distribution of wages, which is being published 
biannually (in March and September) by the SORS. Both data sources contain data on 
gross wages, whereas the first data source also contains data on other income sources of 
wage-earners, as well as data on employee social contributions and withheld PIT. 
 
5 We note that such an approach, i.e. analyses based on annual data, is preferable to analyses based on two 
cross-sections only. Atkinson expressed ‘[…] serious doubts about the practice adopted recently by the 
OECD of taking observations for ‘mid-1970s’, ‘mid-1980s’ and ‘mid-1990s’. Such a procedure can 
misrepresent the dynamic pattern. A single year can be highly misleading’ (Atkinson, 2003, p. 7). 
6 The reduction in the number of taxable persons actually occurred already in 1993; the decrease was 
from 1,203 thousand in 1992 to 1,058 thousand in 1993.  
7 One must mention that Borak and Pfajfar (2002) use gross income net of PIT as their measure of net 
income; social contributions are not subtracted, so their ‘net income’ includes social contributions.  6
Unfortunately, data on final PIT obligation were not available; it is worth noting, 
however, that for high-income taxable persons the final PIT obligation is mostly higher 
than the sum of monthly withheld PIT, while for low-income taxable persons the PIT 
obligation is usually less that the sum of monthly withheld PIT
8.
4.1. The Data Sources 
 
Our target group consists of wage-earners. This group was determined through the 
registry of the labour active population, for which the SORS assumes responsibility. 
Only persons fulfilling the following criteria were considered: (1) employed full time 
(meaning that information in the registry stated that persons worked at least 36 hours 
per week) and (2) employed with the same employer throughout the year. These persons 
were, using a common identifier, linked with the relevant data from the PIT database. 
The SORS provided grouped data with 15 groups being formed. Unfortunately, these 
groups were formed according to wage and not total income of the employee, which 
would have been preferable. In our view, this minor inconsistency can not alter our 
main findings. Data for each income group contain the number of taxable persons and 
the sum of income by income sources. There were several tables containing these data, 
as taxable persons were also distinguished according to gender and sector of 
employment (private, public). Unfortunately, due to a programming error, the income 
source ‘wage compensation disbursed by institutions other than the employer or the 
Institute for Pension and Disability Insurance’ was not included among income sources 
of wage-earners. This includes compensations disbursed by the Institute for Heath 
Insurance (long-term sickness leave allowance), National Employment Service 
(unemployment allowance) and some other income sources of marginal importance to 
wage-earners. 
  The other statistical source contains data on the wage distribution of employees; 
these data are published by the SORS for the months March and September; we use the 
September data. Data are grouped into 20 income groups. These wage data refer to 
employees who worked full-time in September, meaning from 139 to 200 hours; 
employees in small firms (with one or two employees) and employees working for self-
employed persons are not included
9.
4.2. Analysis and Results 
 
As mentioned in the previous section, we will analyze two sets of data: data from the 
PIT database and data on the distribution of wages, as published by the SORS. The 





As seen from Table 1, wages (including wage compensations paid by employer, and 
cost reimbursements) account for more than 90 per cent of the gross income of wage-
earners. The allowance for vacation accounts for some 5 per cent, income from capital 
 
8 This can be observed in Table A1 of the Appendix. 
9 More detailed methodological explanations are provided in the relevant statistical publication, Rapid 
Reports, published by the SORS. 7
and property accounts for one per cent, whereas income from royalties and property 
rights also accounts for some one per cent of gross income. Income from contractual 
work accounts for somewhat less than one per cent. 
Apart from the structure of income, it would also be important to ascertain the 
distribution of total income and income sources. We will use the Gini coefficient for 
measuring income inequality and the Rao (1969) decomposition for measuring the 
contribution of income sources to overall income inequality. This decomposition is 
given by the following expression: 
 
kk Gs C =￿
where G is the Gini coefficient, sk share of income source k in total income, and Ck the 
coefficient of concentration of income source k. The results of the Rao decomposition 
are shown in Table 2, which presents concentration coefficients for income sources; the 




Overall, the results are not surprising. Income inequality among wage-earners 
increased in the period 1993-2002. From Table 2 we observe that several income 
sources are highly concentrated among the high-income earners. These income sources 
are fringe benefits, severance pay for retirement, awards and solidarity payments, and 
other wage-related disbursements. Also to be noted are the high concentration 
coefficients for income from contractual work, capital gains, income from capital and 
property, royalties and income from property rights. The very low (but positive) value 
of the allowance for annual vacation accords well with our expectations; this simply 
means that wage-earners receive almost the same amount of this allowance
10. The very 
‘egalitarian’ distribution of this allowance is due to government regulation, which 
introduced strong disincentives for allowances greater than the ‘recommended’ values. 
The vacation allowance was subject to PIT since 1991; however, from 1994 onward 
amounts greater than those prescribed by government decree could not be deducted as 
expenses (for corporation income tax). Since 1998 these greater amounts were also 
subject to payment of social contributions. Obviously, these disincentives did not 
completely deter all employers from offering higher vacation allowances to their 
employees. 
  What can be said about the effects of the tax system on income inequality? As we 
have already mentioned, data are available not only for gross income and income 
sources, but also on amounts of employee social contributions paid and withheld PIT; 
unfortunately, data on final PIT paid are not available in this dataset. Using the Rao 
decomposition, we can decompose inequality of gross income on its ‘constituent’ parts, 
i.e. on employee social contributions, withheld PIT and ‘net’ income. Here, ‘net’ 
income is defined as gross income net of employee social contributions and withheld 
PIT. The values of the Gini coefficient and the concentration coefficients are presented 
in Table 3 and Figure 1. 
 
10 If all wage-earners received the same amount of this allowance, the value of the concentration 
coefficient would be zero.  8
<TABLE 3> 
 
Table 3 shows that the concentration coefficients for ‘net’ income are much lower 
than the corresponding Gini coefficients. Doubtlessly, the concentration coefficients for 
the ‘real’ net income, i.e. gross income net of employee social contributions and paid 
PIT, would be even lower. This assertion is based on the analysis of the difference 
between the withheld PIT and final PIT obligation (see Table A1 in the Appendix). 
Thus, as seen from Table A1, taxable persons in the lowest income tax bracket received 
large net paybacks, varying from 23 per cent (in 1994) to 42 per cent (in 2000) of the 
total collected PIT for this income group. However, for taxable persons in the highest 
income tax bracket, net additional payments amounted to some 10 to 13 per cent of total 
collected PIT for this group. In other words, the progressivity of PIT is higher if 




From Table 3 one observes the large increase in the progressivity, caused by the 
new PIT legislation, introduced in late 1993 and being applied from 1994. The 
coefficient of concentration for withheld PIT was 0.3835 in 1993 and 0.4595 in 1994. 
This shock even resulted in a decrease in the concentration coefficient for ‘net’ income 
in 1994 (and, quite possibly, also for actual net income). The decrease in ‘net’ income 
quickly came to an end in 1995, and the inequality in gross income (wages) increasing 
in order to ‘neutralize’ the effects of the new PIT legislation
11. After the tumultuous 
period 1991-1995, the increase in gross income of wage-earners was modest. 
  The increase in income inequality among wage-earners can be further elucidated 
through the analysis of quintile and decile income shares. Table 4 shows the income 
shares accruing to the lowest 20 per cent of wage earners, and to the highest 20 per cent, 
10 per cent and 5 per cent of wage-earners. Data in column A refer to the PIT database 
(and thus to gross income of wage-earners), whereas data in column B refer to data on 
wages, published by the SORS. The values of these indicators of income inequality – 
and even more the direction of change – are quite congruent between the two datasets. 
Both show that the share of gross income (column A) and share of wages (column B) 
accruing to the lowest 20 per cent of wage-earners was lower in 2002 than in 1993. 
Also, the share of income accruing to the top 20 per cent has been steadily increasing up 
to 1999 and has since then levelled-off at a value of some 40 per cent. This trend is also 






Figure 3 shows the share of gross income/wages accruing to the top 10 per cent in 
the total gross income/total wages of the top 20 per cent of wage-earners. Again, one 
 
11 In late May 1995 the National Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia (Državni zbor) passed a law with 
a long-winded title ‘On Enforcing the Agreement on Wage Policy and Other Payments to Employees and 
the Social Agreement for 1995, and the Minimum and Maximum Wage’ (Official Gazette of the Republic 
of Slovenia, 29/95). This law endeavoured to stem the tide of increasing wage dispersion by setting a 
higher value for minimum wage. 9
observes a steady increase up to 1999, followed by a steady decrease. As seen from 
Figure 3, the curve depicting the share of gross income of the top 10 per cent wage-
earners (in the gross income of top 20 per cent of wage-earners) lies strictly above the 
curve depicting the share of gross wages of the top 10 per cent of wage-earners (in gross 
wages of the top 20 per cent of wage-earners). The explanation is straightforward; some 
sources of none-wage income (income from contractual work, income from property 
and capital, income from property rights) are more highly concentrated in the uppermost 




Figure 4 shows the share of gross income/wages of the top 5 per cent of wage 
earners (in gross income/wages of the top 10 per cent of wage-earners). Yet again, the 
curve for gross income is strictly above the curve for gross wages. Also, the curve 
depicting the share of gross income (curve A), based on the PIT data source, is 
smoother than the curve depicting the share of gross wages (curve B). This is quite 
according to expectations, as the share of gross income (curve A) is computed using 
annual data, whereas the share of gross wages (curve B) is computed using monthly 
(September) data; as a general rule, the variability of monthly data is greater than the 
variability of annual data. While the curve for gross income has shown very little 
change since 1996, the curve for gross wages shows a rise in the period 1996-1999, with 




What caused the significant increase in the share of gross income/wages accruing to 
the high income group (be it top 20, 10 or 5 per cent), during the first years of 
transition? An explanation for the increasing share of income accruing to the top wage-
earners was offered by Atkinson (1998), who cited greater individualization of labour 
contracts as a major cause. This process of individualization of labour contracts gained 
considerable momentum in the early years of transition in Slovenia. The SORS, starting 
in 1993, publishes data on the number of individual labour contracts; these have 
increased from 10,885 in March 1993 to 14,104 in September 1994. However, these 
data are not quite reliable, as there is considerable discrepancy between those published 
by the SORS and the data provided by the government Agency for Public 
Documentation and Services (AJPES)
12. The more comprehensive AJPES data 
unfortunately do not cover the most interesting period, i.e. the early 1990s, and are 
being provided only since 1998. The average wage under an individual contract 
represented some 2.8 times the average wage of wage-earners under collective wage 
contracts, placing most persons on individual labour contracts in the top 5 per cent of 
wage-earners. The total amount of wages disbursed according to individual contracts 
represented some 10.6 per cent of all wages in December 1998. The data from Table 5 
clearly imply that since 1998, there has been very little change in the number of 
individual contracts and in the ratio between the average wage under an individual 
contract and the average wage under a collective contract. This ‘non-trend’ in the 
 
12 For example, the number of individual labour contracts in September 1998 was, according to the SORS 
15,594, whereas the corresponding figure provided by AJPES (for December 1998) was 24,085. 10
dynamics of individual contracts had a noticeable impact on the levelling-off (and even 




One must also note that individual labour contracts are concentrated in the private 
sector, as seen from Table 6, where these persons represent some 4.9 per cent of all 
employees in the private sector, with the corresponding share in the public sector being 
only 1.6 per cent. Bearing in mind also the fact that more than 5 per cent of employees 
in the private sector receive minimum wage (see Table 6), it is not surprising that 
income inequality among wage-earners in the private sector is much larger than in the 






Fairly similar trends in income inequality in the private and public sector can be 
observed from Table 7. In particular, the large increase in the Gini coefficient in the 
period 1993-1995 occurred in both the public and private sector. In view of the fact that 
the number of persons employed in the public sector and having an individual labour 
contract is rather low, the similarity between these two developments points to other 
possible causes for the large increase in inequality during the 1993-1995 period. In 
particular, the PIT legislation ought to be singled out. This legislation was first 
introduced in 1991, with a new (second) law superseding the first already in 1993. It 
appears that strong pressures for ‘neutralizing’ the effects of tax progressivity (which 
the second law even enhanced) could not be resisted, and wage dispersion increased. 
Policy-makers reacted to this increase in 1995, by passing a law ‘On Enforcing the 
Agreement on Wage Policy and Other Payments to Employees and the Social 
Agreement for 1995, and the Maximum and Minimum Wage’. Whether this law 
actually served to stem the tide of increasing wage dispersion, or whether the law came 
into force ‘after the storm’, i.e. when the ‘adaptation’ to the new PIT has already been 
achieved, is a moot question. 
  Since 2001, the dynamics of income inequality in the private and public sector were 
out of synch. In that year, the Gini coefficient for income inequality in the public sector 
decreased, with a further large decrease in 2002. There has been no comparable change 
in the private sector. 
5. Concluding Remarks 
 
Our analysis was focused on exploring income inequality among wage-earners. Such an 
analysis does not give the whole ‘picture’, as it is confined to the analysis of market 
incomes of wage-earners. It does not deal with market incomes of other labour active 
groups (such as self-employed). Also missing from the broader ‘picture’ is the analysis 
of incomes after taxes and social transfers – and such an analysis of income inequality, 
using current disposable monetary income, is based on the household as the unit of 
analysis, and not on the individual. In spite of these limitations, several conclusions 
clearly emerge. Income inequality sharply increased in the early years of transition, up 11
to the mid-1990s. However, after 1995 the increases were modest, and a decrease being 
recorded in 2002. Though the large increase in the number of individual labour 
contracts most likely had a certain impact on increasing wage dispersion, the personal 
income tax legislation quite possibly triggered the large increases in wage inequality. 
The distribution of income after PIT withholding tax (for wage-earners) shows smaller 
increases in income inequality than the distribution of gross income, and the registered 
increase in income inequality would certainly be even smaller for ‘true’ after-tax 
income. 
  What will be the course of income inequality in the future? External and internal 
factors will influence the dynamics of income inequality, as globalization and 
internationalization of production will bear strong competitive pressure on a large part 
of the Slovenian economy. The extent of these pressures can best be illustrated by the 
plight of the textile industry in Slovenia. The number of persons employed in this 
industry nearly halved – from 40,663 in 1993 to only 21,662 in 2003. The average wage 
in the textile industry represented some 70 per cent of the national average wage in 
1993 and only 61 per cent in 2003. While legislation and collective wage agreements 
can (and do) influence the distribution of gross wages, they can do little to prevent the 
effects of globalization on a small and open economy. This means that labour intensive 
manufacturing sectors will face continuing competitive pressure and consequently 
downward pressure on wages, whereas sectors shielded from international competition 
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Table 1: The structure of gross income of wage-earners, taxable persons for PIT, 1993-2002
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Total 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
Wages, wage compensations and cost
reimbursements 0.9181 0.9029 0.9005 0.8938 0.8938 0.8998 0.9026 0.9071 0.9089 0.9093
Fringe benefits 0.0023 0.0039 0.0041 0.0047 0.0059 0.0044 0.0044 0.0041 0.0035 0.0033
Allowance for annual vacation 0.0559 0.0501 0.0540 0.0565 0.0546 0.0493 0.0475 0.0453 0.0449 0.0458
Severance pay for retirement, awards, solidarity
payments and other wage-related payments
1 – 0.0019 0.0013 0.0020 0.0021 0.0032 0.0033 0.0037 0.0034 0.0036
Pensions and compensations paid by the IPDI 0.0046 0.0041 0.0058 0.0063 0.0054 0.0054 0.0056 0.0058 0.0061 0.0059
Wages from abroad 0.0000 0.0043 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Pensions from abroad 0.0000 0.0043 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Income from contractual work
2 – 0.0073 0.0075 0.0078 0.0076 0.0074 0.0073 0.0074 0.0074 0.0072
Income of students, received through student
organisations
3 – 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 0.0006 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0002 0.0002
Cadastral income less relevant tax relief and tax
exemptions 0.0024 0.0034 0.0030 0.0027 0.0024 0.0021 0.0022 0.0014 0.0013 0.0017
Self-employment income 0.0009 0.0012 0.0016 0.0016 0.0017 0.0016 0.0017 0.0019 0.0020 0.0021
Capital gains 0.0017 0.0003 0.0002 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0005 0.0004 0.0006 0.0015
Income from capital and property 0.0037 0.0036 0.0081 0.0102 0.0126 0.0121 0.0111 0.0102 0.0102 0.0097
Royalties and income from property rights 0.0103 0.0125 0.0136 0.0138 0.0130 0.0141 0.0135 0.0124 0.0115 0.0097
Notes:
1 The category did not exist in 1993, whereas in 1994 it was labelled ‘other wage-related income’.
2 The category was not included in computation for 1993.
3 The category did not exist in 1993.14
Table 2: The Gini coefficient and concentration coefficients for income sources, wage-earners, 1993-2002
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Gini coefficient
Total 0.2718 0.2794 0.2950 0.2988 0.3024 0.3053 0.3119 0.3109 0.3131 0.3083
Concentration coefficients
Wages, wage compensation and cost
reimbursements 0.2814 0.2873 0.3058 0.3092 0.3112 0.3113 0.3177 0.3181 0.3208 0.3160
Fringe benefits 0.5353 0.4349 0.4393 0.4257 0.4929 0.6180 0.6224 0.6577 0.6355 0.6620
Allowance for annual vacation 0.1074 0.0863 0.0528 0.0605 0.0678 0.0623 0.0788 0.0519 0.0492 0.0639
Severance pay for retirement, awards,
solidarity payments and other wage-related
payments – 0.4313 0.5217 0.5315 0.4932 0.6002 0.6208 0.6544 0.7270 0.7288
Pensions and compensations paid by IPDI –0.4381 –0.3906 –0.2721 –0.2765 –0.4031 –0.4069 –0.4546 –0.4317 –0.4331 –0.4530
Wages from abroad 0.2573 0.2579 0.5171 –0.1783 –0.1325 –0.8076 0.5113 –0.1517 0.6488 0.1817
Pensions from abroad 0.0901 0.2583 0.3275 0.0707 –0.3696 –0.1145 –0.1250 –0.2615 0.1307 –0.1547
Income from contractual work – 0.3878 0.4442 0.4753 0.5210 0.5335 0.5725 0.5725 0.5959 0.5956
Income of students, received through student
organisations – –0.1333 –0.3089 –0.2300 –0.7304 –0.4352 –0.2428 –0.2431 –0.3771 –0.4218
Cadastral income less relevant tax relief and
tax exemptions 0.0023 0.0033 0.0269 0.0334 0.0303 0.0296 0.0286 0.0388 0.0225 0.0153
Self-employment income 0.2191 0.1519 0.1518 0.1818 0.2025 0.1712 0.1175 0.1731 0.1408 0.1176
Capital gains 0.1190 0.3414 0.1953 0.1218 0.3921 0.4019 0.3142 0.4422 0.6299 0.5892
Income from capital and property 0.4870 0.4974 0.5212 0.5326 0.5204 0.5292 0.5340 0.4962 0.4905 0.4984
Royalties and income from property rights 0.5859 0.5891 0.6007 0.5959 0.6126 0.6352 0.6349 0.6209 0.6297 0.595515
Table 3: The Gini coefficients for gross income and concentration coefficients for 
social contributions, withheld PIT and ‘net’ income, wage-earners, 1993-2002 
 






coefficient for social 
contributions 
Concentration 
coefficient for ‘net’ 
income 
1993 0.2718  0.3835  0.2784  0.2452 
1994 0.2794  0.4595  0.2848  0.2386 
1995 0.2950  0.4720  0.3031  0.2546 
1996 0.2988  0.4751  0.3055  0.2575 
1997 0.3024  0.4793  0.3074  0.2616 
1998 0.3053  0.4840  0.3102  0.2634 
1999 0.3119  0.4911  0.3164  0.2693 
2000 0.3109  0.4885  0.3169  0.2678 
2001 0.3131  0.4906  0.3188  0.2697 
2002 0.3083  0.4844  0.3149  0.2652 
Note: Computed on the basis of the PIT database. 
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Table 4: The distribution of gross income (of wage-earners) and wages, Slovenia, 1993-2002
Bottom 20 per cent Top 20 per cent Top 10 per cent Top 5 per cent The Gini Coefficient
A B A B A B A B A B
1993 0.0990 0.0992 0.3724 0.3677 0.2325 0.2263 0.1461 0.1374 0.2718 0.2638
1994 0.0980 0.0961 0.3776 0.3854 0.2424 0.2418 0.1577 0.1496 0.2794 0.2823
1995 0.0916 0.0973 0.3859 0.3905 0.2492 0.2491 0.1610 0.1556 0.2950 0.2859
1996 0.0921 0.0969 0.3896 0.3888 0.2538 0.2475 0.1653 0.1515 0.2988 0.2831
1997 0.0906 0.0940 0.3922 0.3943 0.2550 0.2524 0.1666 0.1577 0.3024 0.2946
1998 0.0909 0.0956 0.3954 0.3915 0.2581 0.2511 0.1686 0.1576 0.3053 0.2913
1999 0.0902 0.0923 0.4014 0.3985 0.2633 0.2568 0.1724 0.1631 0.3119 0.3009
2000 0.0911 0.0903 0.4003 0.3994 0.2606 0.2551 0.1708 0.1603 0.3109 0.3038
2001 0.0907 0.0900 0.4032 0.4009 0.2617 0.2562 0.1711 0.1613 0.3131 0.3073
2002 0.0927 0.0899 0.4006 0.3983 0.2581 0.2526 0.1681 0.1570 0.3083 0.3045
Source: A – Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia, data from the PIT database.
B – Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia, Rapid Reports (The distribution of wages of employees in firms and other organisations, in September).17
Table 5: The number of wage-earners, the amount of disbursed wages and the average 
wage – collective and individual labour contracts, December 1998 and 
December 2003 
 
Category  December 1998  December 2003 
Collective contracts 
Number of wage-earners  577,470  581,550 
Amount of disbursed wages (in billion SIT)  85.9  142.1 
Average wage (in thousand SIT)  148.7  244.3 
Individual contracts 
Number of wage-earners   24,085  23,245 
Amount of disbursed wages (in billion SIT)  10.2  16.1 
Average wage (in thousand SIT)  423.4  691.7 
Source: Internal documentation of AJPES. 
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Table 6: Number of employees, number of employees receiving minimum wage and 
average wage according to sector (public, private), December 2003 
 
Category  Public sector  Private sector 
Collective contracts 
Number of employees  145,483  436,067 
Number of employees receiving minimum wage   –  22,899 
Average wage (in thousand SIT)  317.7  219.9 
Individual contracts 
Number of employees  2,287  20,258 
Average wage (in thousand SIT)  700.6  690.3 
Source: Internal documentation of AJPES. 
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Table 7: The Gini coefficient of income inequality, private and public sector, 1993-
2002 
 
Year  All  Private sector  Public sector 
1993 0.2718  0.2689  0.2345 
1994 0.2794  0.2778  0.2594 
1995 0.2950  0.2941  0.2712 
1996 0.2988  0.2959  0.2719 
1997 0.3024  0.2971  0.2771 
1998 0.3053  0.3015  0.2827 
1999 0.3119  0.3061  0.2909 
2000 0.3109  0.3052  0.2895 
2001 0.3131  0.3064  0.2848 
2002 0.3083  0.3043  0.2699 
Note: Computed on the basis of the PIT database. 20
Table A1: The structure of taxable persons, income, paid PIT and net repayments of PIT by income tax brackets, 1993-2001
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Structure of taxable persons, by income tax brackets
I. 55.0 59.17 59.62 61.14 61.70 62.97 62.82 63.33 63.78
II. 35.9 31.22 30.84 29.57 28.90 27.59 27.90 27.50 26.89
III. 7.8 5.95 5.83 5.58 5.63 5.43 5.51 5.49 5.61
IV. 1.2 1.79 1.80 1.77 1.79 1.75 1.78 1.75 1.76
V. 0.2 1.23 1.25 1.26 1.23 1.19 1.24 1.20 1.24
VI. – 0.64 0.66 0.68 0.74 0.71 0.76 0.73 0.72
All 100.0 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Structure of gross income, by income tax brackets
I. 29.53 35.38 35.67 36.76 37.06 38.35 38.08 38.52 38.66
II. 45.53 38.57 38.06 36.86 36.05 35.22 34.85 34.73 34.09
III. 18.20 11.85 11.70 11.39 11.47 11.21 11.28 11.33 11.62
IV. 5.32 5.07 5.16 5.13 5.20 5.13 5.17 5.12 5.18
V. 1.43 4.81 4.94 5.06 4.95 4.88 5.00 4.91 5.05
VI. – 4.33 4.47 4.80 5.27 5.20 5.60 5.40 5.40
All 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.0021
Table A1: The structure of taxable persons, income, paid PIT and net repayments of PIT by income tax brackets, 1993-2001 (continued)
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Paid PIT as percentage of gross income, by income tax brackets
I. 9.11 6.00 5.81 4.40 5.67 5.62 5.23 5.19 5.55
II. 11.73 11.11 10.97 9.46 10.68 10.49 10.37 10.42 10.54
III. 16.11 16.14 16.22 14.16 16.22 16.10 16.09 16.17 16.34
IV. 21.92 20.01 20.02 17.29 20.08 19.78 19.80 19.78 20.13
V. 27.74 23.58 23.62 19.84 23.66 23.34 23.52 23.52 23.58
VI. – 29.72 29.76 24.83 29.93 29.62 30.07 29.85 30.12
All 12.52 11.76 11.67 9.80 11.61 11.35 11.31 11.23 11.50
Net repayment (final PIT obligation less withheld PIT), as percentage of gross income, by income tax brackets
I. 0.37 –1.41 –1.42 –1.63 –1.68 –1.76 –2.13 –2.20 –1.91
II. 0.74 –0.27 –0.12 –0.38 –0.39 –0.55 –0.59 –0.73 –0.78
III. 0.92 0.38 0.40 0.20 0.19 –0.03 0.02 –0.17 –0.26
IV. 1.72 0.95 0.82 0.69 0.55 0.24 0.46 0.17 0.16
V. 6.50 1.67 1.42 1.20 1.17 0.84 1.08 0.86 0.65
VI. – 3.89 4.23 4.40 3.88 3.26 4.05 3.37 3.16
All 0.80 –0.26 –0.20 –0.41 –0.45 –0.65 –0.71 –0.89 –0.83
Note: In 1993 there were five income tax brackets and since 1994 there were six income tax brackets. In 1993, the width of income tax brackets was as follows: first two
brackets – approximately 50% of average gross wage, third and fourth bracket – approximately 100% of average gross wage, while the fifth was open. Since 1994, the width
of the first four tax brackets was approximately 50% of average gross wage, the fifth was some 100% of average wage, whereas the sixth was open.
Source: For 1993: Analiza podatkov o odmeri dohodnine za leto 1993 in primerjava z leti 1992 in 1991, RUJP. For other years: Dohodnina 2001, DURS.22






























Source:  A – Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia, data from the PIT database. 
  B – Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia, Rapid Reports (The distribution of wages of 
employees in firms and other organisations, in September). 23
























Source:  A – Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia, data from the PIT database. 
  B – Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia, Rapid Reports (The distribution of wages of 
employees in firms and other organisations, in September). 24
Figure 3: The share of gross income/wages of the top 10 per cent of wage-earners in gross 




































Source:  A – Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia, data from the PIT database. 
  B – Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia, Rapid Reports (The distribution of wages of 
employees in firms and other organisations, in September). 25
Figure 4: The share of gross income/wages of the top 5 per cent of wage-earners in gross 




































Source:  A – Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia, data from the PIT database. 
  B – Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia, Rapid Reports (The distribution of wages of 
employees in firms and other organisations, in September). 